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ORANGE REVOLUTION IN RED, WHITE, AND 
BLUE: U.S. IMPACT ON THE 2004 UKRAINIAN 
ELECTION 
NATALIE PRESCOTT* 
Ukraine declared its independence from Communist Russia in 
1991 . . . . This fall, elections were held that were fraudulent.  More 
than 200,000 citizens took to the cold streets in their orange scarves.  
Their leader—sick, disfigured and in great pain for daring to seek 
freedom—stood with them.  The case went to their Supreme Court, 
just like our 2000 election.  In both cases, the courts ruled and the 
people followed the rulings. . . . Ukraine now has a democratically 
elected leader for the first time in more than 60 years.1 
INTRODUCTION 
In 2004, the Ukrainian Supreme Court followed the steps of the 
U.S. Supreme Court in Bush v. Gore2 when it decided to lead the 
country toward the resolution of the election crisis.3 The Court’s rul-
ing in the Yuschenko decision resonated world-wide, resulting in a 
victory for democracy and a bright future for American-Ukrainian re-
lations.  Yet, a major aspect of this decision has gone unnoticed: the 
Ukrainian Supreme Court used this case to exercise its power of judi-
cial review.  As the United States Supreme Court did in the landmark 
case Marbury v. Madison,4 the Ukrainian Court claimed the authority 
to say “what the law is”5 for the first time.  The United States has 
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 1. Joe B. Whisler, The Rule of Law, 61 J. MO. B. 70, 70 (2005). 
 2. 531 U.S. 98 (2000). 
 3. Id. at 111 (2000) (ending an electoral recount in Florida by reversing a judgment of the 
Florida Supreme Court.  The reversal resolved the disputed presidential election of 2000 in fa-
vor of appellant George W. Bush).  
 4. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
 5. Id. at 177. (“It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say 
what the law is.  Those who apply the rule to particular cases, must of necessity expound and 
interpret that rule.  If two laws conflict with each other, the courts must decide on the operation 
of each.”).  
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played a key role in this revolution by helping to shape the Ukrainian 
democracy.  But the language barriers made it difficult for most legal 
scholars to closely analyze this significant legal development. 
This Note, therefore, provides procedural background to the Yu-
shchenko case and explains how the Court’s decision was influenced 
by the United States.  Part I discusses the status of Ukrainian elec-
toral law prior to the events of 2004.  Part II elaborates on the frame-
work of the Yushchenko case, explaining the jurisdictional issues, the 
structure of the Ukrainian judicial system, and the procedural history.  
Part III demonstrates how American leaders foresaw the problematic 
election, and what steps were taken to remedy the situation.  Finally, 
Part IV considers the potential consequences of the Yushchenko deci-
sion both for the Ukrainian judiciary and for the country’s prospects 
of joining the European Union. 
I.  ELECTIONS BACKGROUND 
The Ukrainian President is elected by popular vote for a five-
year term.6  The election process is similar to that of the United 
States.7  For example, Ukrainian citizens who are eighteen or older 
have the right to vote.8  Unlike the polls in the United States, how-
ever, Ukrainian polling stations are supervised by official observers, 
whose duty is to ensure a fair outcome of the elections.9  After the 
votes are cast, regional protocols are prepared and delivered to the 
Central Election Commission (CEC), which then compiles the results 
and announces the winner.10 
 
 6. KONSTITUTSIYA UKRAINI [Constitution] art. 103, available at 
http://www.rada.kiev.ua/const/conengl.htm. 
 7. Id. arts. 69–74 (polling stations are located in each district, and votes are cast by means 
of secret ballots).  Currently only paper ballots are used, but the 2004 Ukraine Presidential ele c-
tion may have provided the government with sufficient incentives to invest in ele ctronic voting 
machines.  See Ambassador John Tefft, U.S. Will Work with Winner of a Free, Fair Election in 
Ukraine, U.S. Info. State. Gov. (Dec. 8, 2004), http://usinfo.state.gov/eur/Archive/2004/Dec/08-
651072.html.  Electronic voting machines were proposed in Florida after allegations of fraud in 
the 2000 U.S. Presidential ele ction.  See Bush, 531 U.S. at 104 (“After the current counting, it is 
likely legislative bodies nationwide will examine ways to improve the mechanisms and machin-
ery for voting.”). 
 8. KONSTITUTSIYA UKRAINI art. 70. 
 9. Central Election Commission of Ukraine [hereinafter CEC], 
http://www.cvk.gov.ua/pls/vp2004/wp0011e (follow “Official Observers from Foreign States and 
International Organizations” hyperlink) (last visited Oct. 31, 2005). 
 10. See generally id. (for information on the election procedures and results). 
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Presidential elections in Ukraine consist of two rounds.11  In the-
ory, a candidate who secures more than fifty-one percent of the votes 
could win based on the first round alone.12  However, this never hap-
pens in practice.  No single candidate, including incumbents, has ever 
won the first round by absolute majority.13  Verkhovna Rada (the 
Ukrainian Parliament) houses a number of political parties, each en-
dorsing its own candidate,14 and additional candidates run independ-
ently.15  This system results in the nomination of more than twenty 
candidates, which makes securing outright majority virtually impossi-
ble.16  Thus, the top two candidates advance to the second round.17  
Thereafter, the winner is determined by a simple majority vote.18 
In the first round of the 2004 presidential elections, candidates 
Victor Yushchenko and Victor Yanukovych received the two highest 
percentages of votes, though both fell short of obtaining the needed 
majority.19  Yushchenko, a pro-Western Democrat who ran inde-
pendently, promised to take steps toward securing Ukraine’s mem-
bership in the European Union and improving its relations with the 
United States.20  Yanukovich, nominated by the Party of Regions, 
 
 11. See generally CEC, supra  note 9 (follow “Results of Voting in Ukraine” hyperlink) 
(discussing the results of the two rounds of elections and the results of the repeated voting). 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id.; see also Official Website of the President of Ukraine, 
http://www.preside nt.gov.ua/en (follow “President of Ukraine” hyperlink; then follow ”The His-
tory of Presidency” hyperlink) (last visited Oct. 31, 2005). 
 14. See KATARYNA WOLCZUK, THE  MOULDING OF UKRAINE: THE CONSTITUTIONAL 
POLITICS OF STATE FORMATION 131 (2001) (discussing party membership in Ukrainian Parlia-
ment in 1994);  see also CEC, http://www.cvk.gov.ua/pls/vp2004/wp0011e (follow “Candidates to 
the Post of President of Ukraine” hyperlink) (last visited Oct. 31, 2005).  
 15. CEC, http://www.cvk.gov.ua/pls/vp2004/wp0011e (follow “Candidates to the Post of 
President of Ukraine” hyperlink) (last visited Oct. 31, 2005).  Twenty-four candidates were 
listed on the ba llot in the 2004 presidential elections, nine of whom, including Yushchenko, ran 
independently.  Id. 
 16. Id. 
 17. See id. 
 18. See id. 
 19. CEC, http://www.cvk.gov.ua/pls/vp2004/wp0011e (follow “Results of Voting in 
Ukraine” hyperlink; then follow “The Elections of the President of Ukraine, 31 October, 2004” 
hyperlink) (last visited Oct. 31, 2005).  In the first round of elections, Yushchenko received 
39.9%, and Yanukovych secured 39.2% of the votes.  Id. 
 20. Anna Melnichuk, Ukraine’s Opposition Scores Victory , CASPER STAR TRIBUNE, Dec. 3, 
2004, at 34 (Viktor Yushchenko, who was a former central bank chief and prime minister “cam-
paigned for president on a promise to forge closer ties with the West ”); see also Daniel Dombey 
et al., Yushchenko Takes Over with Eye on Europe, FIN. TIMES, January 24, 2005, at 6 (in his 
inaugural speech Yushchenko reiterated his campaign promise: “Our way to the future is the 
way of a united Europe.  We, along with the people of Europe, belong to one civilization.  Our 
place is in the European Union.”). 
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promised to reestablish close ties with Russia.21 Because neither can-
didate received the requisite absolute majority, a second round of 
elections was held.22  This second round became the basis of the 2004 
world-wide controversy.23  Although Yanukovych won the second 
round by a narrow margin, numerous factors indicated that his victory 
was gained by fraud.24 
The most significant evidence of fraud was a suspiciously high 
voter turnout reported at over ninety percent.25  Ukrainians are active 
in politics, and high voter turnout is not uncommon.26  Every five 
years close to seventy percent of eligible citizens vote in presidential 
and parliamentary elections — a considerably high percentage by in-
ternational standards.27  However, the single instance of a ninety-
percent voter turnout was in 1991, when Ukrainians voted over-
whelmingly for the nation’s independence.28  In presidential elections, 
voter turnout never before approached the ninety-percent bench-
mark.29 
Other factors further pointed to a fabrication of the results.  
Many individuals were allowed to vote twice; thousands of absentee 
ballots went missing, only to reappear in the voting bins shortly be-
fore the polling stations closed; and some citizens complained of 
threats and coercion.30  In several districts, international independent 
 
 21. CASPER STAR TRIBUNE, supra note 20 (noting that Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovych 
“[c]ampaigned for the presidency on a promise to forge closer ties with Russia [and] received 
strong Kremlin backing”). 
 22. See CEC, http://www.cvk.gov.ua/pls/vp2004/wp0011e (follow “Results of Voting  in 
Ukraine” hyperlink; then follow “The Elections of the President of Ukraine, 31 October, 2004” 
hyperlink) (last visited Oct. 31, 2005). 
 23. U.S. Congressman Jim Leach called Ukrainian election “one of the semifinal events of 
this new century.”  150 CONG. REC. E2198 (daily ed. Dec. 7, 2004) (statement of Rep. Leach).  
 24. Presidential Runoff Election in Ukraine, S. Res. 487, 108th Cong. (2004); see also EU 
Urges Fair Ukrainian Elections, BBC NEWS, Oct. 1, 1999, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/world/europe/463192.stm. 
 25. See CEC, supra note 22. 
 26. International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, Voter Turnout, 
http://www.idea.int/vt/country_view.cfm?CountryCode=UA (last visited Oct. 31, 2005). 
 27. Id.  Between 1994 and 2002, approximately seventy percent of eligible Ukrainians 
voted in presidential and parliamentary ele ctions.  Id.  In the USA, voter turnout during the 
same period hovered around fifty percent.  Id. 
 28. Richard C.O. Rezie, Note, The Ukrainian Constitution: Interpretation of the Citizens’ 
Rights Provisions, 31 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 169, 183 (1999); see also Judge Bohdan A. Futey, 
Comments on the Constitution of Ukraine, E. EUR. CONST. REV., Spring/Summer 1996, at 29. 
 29. See International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, 
http://www.idea.int/vt/country_view.cfm?CountryCode=UA (last visited Oct. 31, 2005). 
 30. S. Res. 487, 108th Cong. (2004).  
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observers were denied entry into the polling stations.31  Additionally, 
there were instances of assaults on electoral observers, illegal voting, 
and usage of counterfeit ballots.32  A hotline, established by an inde-
pendent U.S. organization, registered 7,476 calls from concerned citi-
zens complaining about these violations.33 
But the most egregious wrongdoing was yet to be discovered.  
On September 6, 2004 Yushchenko reported to a local hospital.34  
There were rumors that he was poisoned, but doctors were unable to 
find traces of poison in his blood.35  Only three long months later, af-
ter numerous tests and examinations in the best medical facilities, 
doctors were able to conclusively establish that Yushchenko was poi-
soned by dioxin.36  He survived the attack and was able to remain in 
the presidential race, despite numerous hospital visits and continuing 
treatment.37  However, as a result of the poisoning, his face became 
badly disfigured.38  Yushchenko and his supporters blamed this al-
 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. 
 33. See American Bar Association, Central European and Eurasian Law Initiative in 
Ukraine, http://www.abanet.org/ceeli/countries/ukraine/ukraine_2004_elections_activities (last 
visited Oct. 31, 2005). 
 34. Elizabeth Rosenthal, American Doctors Helped Identify Ukraine Leader’s Poisoning , 
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 13, 2005, at 13; U.S. Doctors Treated Yushchenko; Secret Team Helped Find 
Dioxin, WASH. POST, March 11, 2005, at A01 (doctors initially suspected inadvertent food poi-
soning, but it soon became clear that poisoning was intentional). 
 35. Elizabeth Rosenthal, American Doctors Helped Identify Ukraine Leader’s Poisoning , 
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 13, 2005, at 13. 
 36. Id. Dioxin is “one of the most toxic chemicals known to science.”  Dioxin Homepage, 
http://www.ejnet.org/dioxin/ (last visited Oct. 31, 2005).  There is no “safe” level of dioxin: it is 
linked to cancer and is known for its ability to damage the immune system.  Id.  Dioxin is pre-
sent in food, and most of it comes from the consumption of beef.  Id.  It is extremely difficult to 
detect, as most laboratories do not have the necessary equipment and do not routinely test for 
dioxin; moreover, in most people, levels of dioxin are not high enough to be detected.  Ques-
tions and Answers about Dioxins, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services 
http://www.cfsan.fda.gov/~lrd/dioxinqa.html (last visited Oct. 31, 2005). 
 37. See Elizabeth Rosenthal, American Doctors Helped Identify Ukraine Leader’s Poison-
ing, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 13, 2005, at 13. 
 38. Id. (“Mr. Yushchenko, who is still suffering from disfiguring cysts of his face, will need 
long-term treatment for his skin, . . . drugs to help his body dispel the dioxin, [and] close moni-
toring for signs of cancer . . . .”).  Presently, doctors are strongly advising Yushchenko against 
plastic surgery.  Id. 
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leged assassination attempt on the opposition.39  Nevertheless, there 
was no physical evidence linking Yanukovych to the poisoning.40 
Even after the U.S.S.R. relinquished its control of the state, 
Ukraine had seen its share of repression.41  The government had al-
ways retained extensive control over mass media, and “many mem-
bers of the press have been murdered, after printing articles about 
government corruption and theft.”42  Yet, never before43 corrupt at-
tempts to secure presidency have been so extensive, so bold, and so 
egregious.44 
International organizations and foreign nations were stunned by 
the events in Ukraine.45  News reports about Ukrainian elections 
flooded the internet and television.46  The European Union issued a 
public opinion, calling for a new and fair election,47 and the United 
Nations called “on all sides to exercise maximum restraint and to re-
 
 39. Security Official Denies Role in Poisoning , CHI. TRIB., Dec. 19, 2004, at 25 (“Yu-
shchenko has accused the authorities of poisoning him in an attempted ‘political murder’ to 
push him out of the presidential race, saying he most likely was poisoned at a dinner Sept. 5 with 
Ukraine’s security agency chief . . . .”). 
 40. Doctors suspected the poisoning was intentional because Yushchenko’s levels of dioxin 
exceeded normal levels 1,000 times, but they “would not speculate on the source.”  See Eliza-
beth Rose nthal, Yushchenko Able to Serve, But Will Need Longtime Care, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 27, 
2004, at 12. 
 41. See Rezie, supra note 28, at 204 (discussing  former President Kuchma’s blatant disre-
spect for the rule of law). 
 42. See id.; see also WOLCZUK, supra  note 14, at 277-78. 
 43. With the exception of the murder of a Ukrainian journalist in 2000, which was linked to 
the administration.  See Kuchma to Be Quizzed Over Journa list’s Death, THE INDEPENDENT 
(London), Mar. 10, 2005, at 21 (“Ukrainian prosecutors want to talk to former president Leonid 
Kuchma as part of their investigation into the killing of a journalist . . . . Mr Kuchma’s oppo-
nents have accused him of involvement in the death of the investigative journalist Georgiy Gon-
gadze, who was killed in 2000.”). 
 44. Reportedly, the Supreme Court Justices even “have been physically threatened to rule 
in favour of Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovych.”  Stephen Mulvey, Tough Choice for Ukrain-
ian Court, BBC NEWS, Nov. 29, 2004, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4051641.stm.  In fact, 
the names of the Justices were “kept secret until the last minute to protect them from outside 
interference.”  Id. 
 45. See INT’L ELECTION OBSERVATION MISSION, PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION (REPEAT 
SECOND ROUND), UKRAINE, available at 
http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/UNTC/UNPAN019428.pdf. (last visited 
Oct. 31, 2005).  
 46. Inquiries about the Ukrainian Elections generated 4,730,000 hits on Google on De-
cember 17, 2005.  See http://www.google.com (last visited Dec. 17, 2005). 
 47. Presidency Conclusions 16238/04, Declaration on Ukraine, Annex I, 2004 O.J.  Benita 
Ferrero-Waldner, Comm’r for External Relations & European Neighborhood Policy, Situation 
in Ukraine: Address before the European Parliament (Jan. 12, 2004), available at 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/news/ferrero/2004/speech04_506_en.htm (last vis-
ited Oct. 31, 2005). 
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frain from divisive political statements that could endanger the stabil-
ity of the country.”48  Members of the United States Congress rec-
ommended a new election.49  Finally, yielding to the pressure, on De-
cember 1, the Ukrainian Parliament passed a non-binding “no-
confidence vote,” urging the Court to step in.50  Despite the world-
wide political pressure, a lawsuit challenging the election results ap-
peared to be the only viable remedy. 
Resorting to the Administration was not an option, because the 
President had no power to select the winner.51  As for the Ukrainian 
Parliament, although it arguably had the power to act in the emer-
gency circumstances,52 its involvement would have been detrimental 
to either candidate. For Yushchenko, Parliament’s involvement 
meant losing the election because Yanukovych, who was a Prime 
Minister at the time, had substantial support of the Parliament and 
the President.53  Likewise, a victory would be short-lived for 
Yanukovych because there was a significant risk that Ukrainians 
would revolt if the Parliament appointed Yanukovych the president.54 
Consequently, after the fraudulent results were announced, Yu-
shchenko immediately appealed the results to the Ukrainian Supreme 
Court.55  He claimed violations of the election laws and asked the 
 
 48. Highlights of the Spokesman’s Noon Briefing, Annan Calls for Patience and Respect 
Amid Court Review of Ukrainian Election, (Nov. 29, 2004), available at 
http://www.un.org/News/ossg/hilites/hilites_arch_view.asp?HighID=174 (last visited Oct. 31, 
2005). 
 49. See 150 CONG. REC. E2138 (daily ed. Nov. 24, 2004) (statement of Rep. Davis); 150 
CONG. REC. E2198 (daily ed. Dec. 7, 2004) (statement of Rep. Leach); 150 CONG. REC. S12021 
(daily ed. Dec. 8, 2004) (statements of Sens. Frist and Reid); Presidential Runoff Election in 
Ukraine, S. Res. 487, 108th Cong. (2004). 
 50. Ambassador John Tefft, Deputy Assistant Sec’y for European & Euraisan Affairs, Tes-
timony Before the House International Relations Committee: U.S. Will Work with Winner of a 
Free, Fair Election in Unkraine (Dec. 7, 2004), available at 
http://www.usembassy.it/file2004_12/alia/a4120802.htm; Presidential Runoff Election in 
Ukraine, S. Res. 487, 108th Cong. (2004). 
 51. See generally  KONSTITUTSIYA UKRAINI arts. 102-12 (outlining the powers of the Ukra-
nian president, which do not include the authority to select a new president). 
 52. See KONSTITUTSIYA UKRAINI  art. 85 (pointing out that Verkhovna Rada [The 
Ukrainian Parliament] has the power to remove “the President of Ukraine from office” through 
impeachment). 
 53. See Tefft, supra note 50 (discussing “abuse of state resources to support the govern-
ment’s candidate, Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovych [and] a near-monopoly of media attention 
for Yanukovych”). 
 54. See generally Presidential Runoff Election in Ukraine , S. Res. 487, 108th Cong. (2004) 
(describing protests of tens of thousands of people against declaring Yanukovych the winner). 
 55. Rishennia Verkhovnogo Sudu Ukraini [Decision of the Ukrainian Supreme Court] of 
December 3, 2004, http://zakon.rada.gov.ua/cgi-bin/laws/main.cgi?nreg=n0090700%2D04.  An 
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Court for injunctive and declaratory relief.56  The lawsuit was met 
with skepticism because the Ukrainian Supreme Court had never be-
fore declared an election invalid, nor it ever asserted its power to in-
terpret the election laws.57  Nevertheless, thousands of Yushchenko’s 
supporters, dressed in orange—Yushchenko’s campaign color—
gathered in the nation’s capital.58  They protested peacefully, although 
the threats that the country would divide were circulating on the 
streets of Kiev.59   
Despite the very cold Ukrainian winter, protestors were on the 
streets day and night, sleeping in tents and relying on food that was 
delivered by international organizations.  An independent Ukraine 
had never before seen such determination. 
On December 3, 2004 the Supreme Court issued a ruling, an-
nouncing that evidence of numerous violations made it impossible to 
fairly calculate the results of the elections and ordering a runoff.60  
While the Court did not go so far as to proclaim Yushchenko the 
winner, his supporters rejoiced.  Yushchenko subsequently won the 
runoff election by a lead of more than two million votes.61  In his pub-
lic address delivered after his victory, Yushchenko proclaimed: 
“[A]fter the Orange Revolution, the country and the nation have 
changed.  Not only do we have an independent country, we have a 
free country . . . .”62 
 
excerpt in English is available at 
http://www2.pravda.com.ua/en/archive/2004/december/3/5.shtml (last visited Oct. 31, 2005). 
 56. See id. 
 57. See Matthew Schofield, Ukraine Supreme Court Orders New Election, PITTSBURGH 
POST-GAZETTE, Dec. 4, 2004, at A1 (“Beyond canceling a faked vote, the decision establishes 
the Supreme Court’s independence, which had been in doubt.”); see also Matthew J. Spense, 
American Prosecutors as Democracy Promoters: Prosecuting Corrupt Foreign Officials in U.S. 
Courts, 114 YALE L.J. 1185, 1188 n.15 (2005) (“[T]he Supreme Court of Ukraine showed unex-
pected independence in ruling against then-Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovich’s attempt to as-
sume the presidency through a corrupt election.”). 
 58. Tefft, supra note 50. (The protests began shortly after the preliminary results of the 
second round of election were announced). 
 59. See Presidential Runoff Election in Ukraine, S. Res. 487, 108th Cong. (2004). 
 60. Decision of the Ukrainian Supreme Court of December 3, 2004, supra note 55. 
 61. Yushchenko supporters expected him to lead the runoff election by a wide margin; 
however, Yushchenko led by a narrower margin, securing 52% of popular vote, which was nev-
ertheless sufficient to secure victory.  C. J. Chivers, Yushchenko Wins 52% of Vote; Rival Vows 
a Challenge, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 28, 2004, at A3 (Yushchenko led Yanukovych by 52.06 percent to 
44.14 percent).  
 62. Press Release, The White House, Vice President’s Remarks with Ukrainian President 
Yushchenko (Jan. 27, 2005), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/01/20050127-1.html. 
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International media referred to the Court’s decision as a surprise 
and as the new democracy in Ukraine.63  In front of the Supreme 
Court, thousands of people gathered, cheering and waiving orange 
flags.64 December 3—the day on which the Ukrainian Supreme Court 
ordered a new, democratic election—was forever engraved in history 
as the date of the “Orange Revolution.”65 
II.  PROCEDURAL HISTORY OF THE YUSHCHENKO CASE 
A. Jurisdiction and Composition of the Supreme Court 
The Yushchenko case was filed directly before the Supreme 
Court.66  The Ukrainian Supreme Court is the “highest judicial body 
in the system of courts of general jurisdiction.”67  Its decisions are fi-
nal and cannot be appealed.68  While the Court ordinarily hears ap-
peals from lower courts, it has original jurisdiction over election mat-
ters.69  Importantly, even when the Court has jurisdiction to decide a 
case, it must refer constitutional questions to the separate and distinct 
Constitutional Court, which is the sole judicial body for deciding con-
stitutional matters.70 
The Yushchenko case was heard before a panel of nineteen Jus-
tices and the presiding Chief Justice.71  The Civil Division, which has 
jurisdiction to decide election matters, currently has twenty-two Jus-
 
 63. See, e.g., Brady Williamson, Ukrainians Decide Future-Sense of Momentous Turning 
Point Marks Vote, THE CAPITAL TIMES, Dec. 27, 2004, at 1A. 
 64. Tefft, supra  note 50 (noting that the protests began shortly after the preliminary results 
of the second round of the election were announced). 
 65. Press Release, Vice President’s Remarks, supra note 62. 
 66. See Decision of the Ukrainian Supreme Court of December 3, 2004, supra  note 55. 
 67. KONSTITUTSIYA UKRAINI art. 125. 
 68. Decision of the Ukrainian Supreme Court of December 3, 2004, supra note 55. 
 69. During a meeting with CEELI representatives, Chief Justice Yarema explained that 
the Court decides election matters as the court of first instance, within five days after the case is 
filed—as required by Ukrainian law.  See Zustrich iz Predstavnikami Misii OBCE [Meeting with 
CEELI Representatives], (Oct. 15, 2004) 
http://www.scourt.gov.ua/clients/vs.nsf/0/EC4F7F0910EF3D77C3256F9D002AB6DF?OpenDoc
ument&CollapseView&RestrictToCategory=EC4F7F0910EF3D77C3256F9D002AB6DF; see 
also Zakon Pro Sudoustriy Ukraiini, Glava 8, Stattya 47; [Law on the Structure of the Ukrainian 
Judiciary , ch. 8, art. 47], 
http://www.scourt.gov.ua/clients/vs.nsf/0/F7FE086C2BD85DD342256C9B003F1550?OpenDocu
ment&CollapseView&RestrictToCategory=F7FE086C2BD85DD342256C9B003F1550 (last 
visited Oct. 31, 2005).  
 70. KONSTITUTSIYA UKRAINI art. 147; Rezie, supra  note 28, at 171. 
 71. Decision of the Ukrainian Supreme Court of December 3, 2004, supra note 55. 
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tices on the panel.72  The Court cannot deny certiorari, and hence the 
docket is always full.73  There are currently 25,000 cases pending be-
fore the Civil Division alone.74  This means it may take several years 
or longer for a case to be decided.75  However, the law defines circum-
stances under which the Supreme Court must give priority and decide 
a case immediately.76  Accordingly, election matters must be decided 
within three to five days.77  The Court may delay announcing its deci-
sion if it must certify a question to the Constitutional Court.78  How-
ever, in this instance, the Supreme Court chose to decide the entire 
matter itself.79  Although it complied with the five-day requirement, 
there is a question as to whether it violated the Constitution by decid-
ing a constitutional issue without referring it to the Constitutional 
Court.80 
B. Yushchenko: The Landmark Decision 
On December 3, 2004, the Ukrainian Supreme Court issued its 
stunning decision.81  Citing numerous violations and instances of 
fraud, the Court declared the actions of Central Election Commission 
invalid and ordered a new runoff election to be held on December 
26.82  This complaint was filed by Yushchenko’s representatives 
against the CEC, and Yanukovych intervened as an “interested per-
son.”83  Petitioners asked the Court (1) to find that the CEC acted 
unlawfully during the counting stage, (2) to invalidate the CEC’s an-
nouncement that Yanukovych had won the second round, (3) to find 
that serious violations of election law had occurred during the second 
round of election, (4) to invalidate the results of the second round, 
 
 72. Meeting with CEELI Representatives,  supra note 69. 
 73. Verkhovniy Sud Ukraini [Official Website of Ukrainian Supreme Court], Sudova Pra c-
tika: Sudova Statistica  [Judicial Practice: Judicial Statistics], http://www.scourt.gov.ua (last vis-
ited September 26, 2005) (noting that 67,000 cases were filed with the Court in 2004) (transla-
tion by author). 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. 
 76. See Law on Structure of the Ukrainian Judiciary , supra  note 69, ch. 8, art. 47. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Decision of the Ukrainian Supreme Court of December 3, 2004, supra note 55. 
 80. See Futey, supra  note 28, at 32 (relying on Chapter VII of Ukrainian Constitution to 
conclude that the Supreme Court “can neither interpret laws, nor declare laws and acts uncon-
stitutional”). 
 81. See Decision of the Ukrainian Supreme Court of December 3, 2004, supra note 55. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. 
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and (5) to choose the winner based on the results of the first round 
alone.84 
Petitioners presented evidence of numerous violations of elec-
tion law, instances of fraud, and other irregularities that occurred on 
the election day.85  Not surprisingly, Yanukovych and the CEC ob-
jected to Petitioners’ request, claiming that even if violations did oc-
cur, they “did not impact and could not impact the results of the elec-
tions.”86  The Court disagreed.  After being presented with evidence 
of fraud that it found to be credible, the Court granted the first four 
of Petitioners’ requests, noting the following violations:87 
1. The CEC failed to examine the regional protocols and to 
check them for authenticity. 
2. The CEC failed to comply with Article 83(6) of the Presiden-
tial Elections Act. 
3. The CEC neglected to consider timely complaints of viola-
tions. 
4. Some citizens were allowed to vote twice. 
5. In many instances, ineligible individuals were allowed to 
vote. 
6. Absentee ballots were cast and delivered without due control 
on the part of the CEC. 
7. There were numerous instances of voting outside the desig-
nated poll areas. 
8. Many independent observers were denied the opportunity to 
observe the voting process.88 
The Court concluded that these circumstances were sufficient to es-
tablish violations of Articles 38, 71, and 103 of the Ukrainian Consti-
tution and Article 11(2) of the Presidential Elections Act.89  Because 
it was “impossible to determine the actual will of the voters,” the 
Court ordered the CEC to hold a new election.90  Thus, the Court 
granted Petitioners’ first four requests but denied the fifth request, 
noting that the outcome of the election could not be determined by 
 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Decision of the Ukrainian Supreme Court of December 3, 2004, supra note 55. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. 
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the results of the first round alone.91  Neither candidate achieved an 
outright majority vote in the first round, and the Presidential Elec-
tions Act specifically provided for a second round of voting in such 
circumstances.92 
This decision was “final,” which meant it could not be appealed.93  
However, a question remains as to whether the Court had jurisdiction 
to decide constitutional matters.94  As some commentators have sug-
gested, the Supreme Court “can neither interpret laws, nor declare 
laws and acts unconstitutional.”95  Nonetheless, by finding violations 
of certain articles of the Constitution and the Presidential Elections 
Act, the Court effectively claimed the power to decide these mat-
ters.96  The proper procedure would have been for the Court to make 
factual determinations and then refer the question to the Constitu-
tional Court.97  However, the Court did not do so—most likely for 
two reasons.  First, due to obvious time constraints, it was impractical 
to refer the question.  Second, a referral would undermine the Court’s 
authority in the future. 
Like Chief Justice John Marshall in Marbury v. Madison, the 
Ukrainian Supreme Court Justices were concerned about judicial su-
premacy and felt that it was sound to assert the Court’s power of judi-
cial review in a decision that the entire world was awaiting .98 
Importantly, the jurisdictional issue was never raised by the Re-
spondents.  Perhaps they failed to catch this error, or perhaps they ac-
tually believed that the Court had the authority it claimed to have.99  
It is equally possible that this was a tactical attempt by the Respon-
 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Decision of the Ukrainian Supreme Court of December 3, 2004, supra note 55. 
 94. See Futey, supra note 28, at 33. 
 95. See id. (interpreting Chapter VII of the Ukrainian Constitution). 
 96. See WOLCZUK, supra note 14, at 259-60 (pointing out that, although the Ukrainian 
Constitutional Court “was conceived as a powerful institution,” it found itself in a vulnerable 
position, often striving “to limit the impact of its rulings by carefully seeking out the middle 
ground”).  
 97. See KONSTITUTSIYA UKRAINI  art. 147 (“The Constitutional Court of Ukraine shall be 
the sole body of constitutional jurisdiction in Ukraine.”).  See also KONSTITUTSIYA UKRAINI 
art. 150 (noting that the Constitutional Court has the sole authority to decide the constitutiona l-
ity of laws passed by the Parliament). 
 98. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (“It is emphatically the province 
and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.”). 
 99. See Decision of the Ukrainian Supreme Court of December 3, 2004, supra note 55. 
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dents to curtail lengthy judicial proceedings.100  Finally, Respondents 
may have simply desired a ruling from a more prestigious and au-
thoritative court.101  Despite this failure to object to jurisdiction, 
Yanukovich and his supporters continued to litigate aggressively, 
bringing three additional complaints shortly after the Yushchenko 
case was decided.102 
C. Subsequent Cases 
On December 24, 2004 forty-six members of the Verchovna 
Rada (Ukrainian Parliament) filed a case in the Constitutional Court, 
asking it to declare the Presidential Elections Act unconstitutional.103  
In this case, Petitioners claimed that the Act violated rights and free-
doms of Ukrainian citizens.104  The Act provided that all citizens had 
to report to the polling stations in order to vote.105  Petitioners argued 
that the Act violated the right of those disabled citizens who were un-
able to attend the polling stations.106  After hearing the testimony of 
numerous experts, the court granted this request.107  The court held 
that Article 6 of the Act restricted disabled citizens’ right to vote by 
prohibiting voting outside the polling stations.108  Moreover, Article 6 
requires certain proof of disability, which—in the court’s view—made 
 
 100. Yanukovych may have also believed that the Constitutional Court would easily give in 
under pressure and rule for Yushchenko.  See WOLCZUK, supra note 14, at 259-60. 
 101. Additionally, parties may have rightly believed that the Ukrainian people would be 
more inclined to accept the negative outcome from the Supreme Court, rather than from the 
Constitutional Court, since European constitutional courts do not receive the same kind of de f-
erence as the high courts of general jurisdiction.  See Larry Alexander & Lawrence B. Solum, 
Popular?  Constitutionalism? , 118 HARV. L. REV. 1594, 1601 (2005) (reviewing LARRY D. 
KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 
(2004)) (noting that “constitutional courts of Europe  . . . combine ultimate interpretive authority 
with a high degree of insulation from popular opinion”). 
 102. See infra text accompanying notes 103-19.  The first case was filed in the Constitutional 
Court by the members of the Ukrainian Parliament, challenging constitutionality of the Presi-
dential Ele ction Act; the second and third cases were filed by Yanukovych, who claimed CEC’s 
non-compliance with the Act and asked the Court to order yet another runoff election. 
 103. See Rishennia Konstitutsiynogo Sudu Ukraini [Decision of the Ukrainian Constitu-
tional Court] of December 24, 2004, available at http://zakon.rada.gov.ua/cgi-
bin/laws/main.cgi?nreg=v022p710%2D04 (last visited Sept. 26, 2005). 
 104. See id. 
 105. See id.; see also KONSTITUTSIYA UKRAINI art. 46 (guaranteeing “the right to be pro-
tected in the event full, partial, or temporary disability”). 
 106. Decision of the Ukrainian Constitutional Court of December 24, 2004, supra note 103. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. 
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it more difficult for disabled citizens to exercise their right to vote.109  
The court thus declared Article 6 of the Act unconstitutional.110 
On December 25, 2004, one day before the runoff election, 
Yanukovych filed a claim in the Supreme Court.111  Relying on the 
above decision of the Constitutional Court, Yanukovych claimed that 
the CEC continued to act improperly, violating rights of disabled citi-
zens.112 This case was Yanukovych’s tactical attempt to delay the run-
off election or to invalidate possibly unfavorable results, so that Par-
liament could intervene and declare him the winner.113  However, the 
Court rejected his claim, and used this as an opportunity to have its 
own Marbury v. Madison moment.114  The Court pointed out that the 
CEC had a right to require proof of disability.115  Thus, without spe-
cifically overruling the Constitutional Court—which it did not have 
the authority to do—the Supreme Court issued a ruling that was, in 
part, contrary to the Constitutional Court’s decision.  Once again, the 
 
 109. Id.  The Act provided that only citizens with “category I” disability (those who were 
immobile) could vote outside the voting poll areas.  They had to present notary -certified copies 
of official documents, evidencing  disability, or other various documents if notary was not avail-
able.  The court found that this violated rights of those disabled citizens whose disabilities did 
not fall under category I, and that the means required by the Act to prove disability were too 
burdensome.  See id. 
 110. Decision of the Ukrainian Constitutional Court of December 24, 2004, supra note 103.  
One judge wrote a concurring opinion, pointing out that the court should have also considered 
the right to vote via absentee ballots as the reason for invalidating the Act.  Id.  Another judge 
dissented on the grounds that proof required to show disability was not burdensome, and that 
local governments should be the one s responsible for encouraging and providing an opportunity 
for the disabled citizens to attend the polls.  Id. 
 111. Rishennia Verkhovnogo Sudu Ukraini [Decision of the Ukrainian Supreme Court] of 
December 26, 2004, http://zakon.rada.gov.ua/cgi-bin/laws/main.cgi?nreg=n0119700%2D04 (last 
visited Oct. 31, 2005).  Refusing to accept the outcome of the runoff election, Yanukovych 
claimed that this time nearly five million people—one tenth of the Ukrainian population did not 
have a chance to vote.  Chivers, supra note 61, at A3. 
 112. Decision of the Ukrainian Supreme Court of December 26, 2004, supra  note 111. 
 113. Yanukovych, who was a Ukrainian Prime Minster at the time of the elections contro-
versy, had substantial support of the Parliament and the outgoing President, and there were ru-
mors that, absent adequate and timely actions on behalf of the Court, the Parliament would step 
in and appoint Yanukovych the President.  See Tefft, supra note 50 (discussing “abuse of state 
resources to support the government’s candidate, Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovych”). 
 114. See Decision of the Ukrainian Supreme Court of December 26, 2004, supra note 111; 
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (“It is emphatically the province and 
duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.  Those who apply the rule to particular 
cases, must of necessity expound and interpret that rule.  If two laws conflict with each other, 
the courts must decide on the operation of each.”). 
 115. Decision of the Ukrainian Supreme Court of December 26, 2004, supra note 111.  In 
fact, contrary to the Constitutional Court’s view, the Court held that the CEC could require any 
proof it deemed necessary.  See id.  
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Supreme Court indicated that it viewed itself as the highest judicial 
body, with jurisdiction to decide all cases and to hear appeals from all 
courts.116 
On January 14, 2005, having lost the election, Yanukovych filed 
yet another claim against the CEC before the Supreme Court.117  He 
argued that the CEC violated certain rules and procedures in the De-
cember 26 election and asked the Court (1) to invalidate the results 
and (2) to order yet another runoff election.118  The Court denied 
both requests after finding that Yanukovych failed to meet his burden 
of proof,119 and that the CEC had complied with the law.120  This line 
of Supreme Court decisions not only resulted in a truly democratic 
election, but also set a promising precedent for the assertion of the 
constitutional power by the Ukrainian judiciary. 
III.  U.S. INFLUENCE ON UKRAINIAN JURISPRUDENCE 
The U.S. influence on Ukraine began in 1991, when this newly 
independent country commenced drafting its constitution.  As one 
commentator noted, “[c]onstitutions do not develop in a political 
vacuum.”121  When a country is engaged in the constitution-drafting 
process, it looks “to well-tested constitutional models and attempt[s] 
to rebuild them in the context of [its] own geopolitical circum-
stances.”122  Ukraine turned to the U.S. constitutional model, which 
has been tested by centuries of judicial opinions.123  However, the 
U.S. Constitution was not the only thing borrowed by Ukraine in the 
process.  Substantial resources were expended by the U.S. govern-
ment and nongovernmental organizations with the goal of improving 
 
 116. A similar assumption was made by the Supreme Court in the December 3 opinion, 
when it decided the  constitutionality of the CEC acts without referring the question to the Con-
stitutional Court.  See supra text accompanying notes 94-101. 
 117. See Rishennia Verkhovnogo Sudu Ukraini [Decision of the Ukrainian Supreme Court] 
of January 20, 2005, http://zakon.rada.gov.ua/cgi-bin/laws/main.cgi?nreg=n0001700%2D05 (last 
visited Oct. 31, 2005).  Yushchenko intervened as an interested party.  Id. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id.; see also Chivers, supra  note 61, at A3 (“It was easier to make allegations . . . then to 
demonstrate them with facts.”). 
 120. Decision of the Ukrainian Supreme Court of January 20, 2005, supra  note 117.  Impor-
tantly, international observers similarly “declared that the conduct of the voting on [December 
26] was a substantial improvement over previous rounds.”  Chivers, supra note 61, at A3. 
 121. Rett R. Ludwikowski, Constitutionalization of Human Rights in Post-Soviet States and 
Latin America: A Comparative Analysis, 33 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 1, 4 (2004). 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. at 12. 
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Ukraine’s judicial system and electoral process.124  Ukrainian judges 
were educated on how to decide election controversies,125 and high 
Ukrainian officials were “instructed” by the United States to refrain 
from improperly influencing election commissioners.126  In 2004, it be-
came clear that the United States succeeded in its goal of fostering 
democracy in Ukraine and made the Orange Revolution possible. 
A. U.S. Influence on the  Ukrainian Constitution 
The U.S. Constitution undoubtedly had an impact on the drafters 
of the Ukrainian Constitution.127  Ukraine adopted its Constitution on 
June 28, 1996, five years after declaring its independence.128  While 
the drafters of the Ukrainian Constitution continuously debated over 
its form, it was clear that the contents would be borrowed from the 
U.S. Constitution.129  First, the U.S. Constitution was a model that was 
convenient, well-known, and tested by centuries.  Second, the U.S. 
government spared no time, efforts, or money persuading Ukraine to 
adopt a U.S.-modeled constitution.  In fact, during the drafting stage, 
the U.S. government sent representatives to the Ukrainian Parlia-
ment to participate in the constitutional debates, to assist the drafters, 
and to persuade them to adopt a democratic version of the Constitu-
tion.  The final version of the Ukrainian Constitution was, in fact, 
very democratic. 
The U.S. influence on the final draft of the Ukrainian Constitu-
tion is evident from substantial similarities between the two docu-
ments.130  First, both constitutions rely on the concept of separation of 
 
 124. Richard W. Soudriette, What Iraq’s Elections Teach Us About Democracy Building , 
HUM. RTS. Spring 2005, at 22 (“America has provided essential funding for elections and for 
associated democratic practices—such as political party development, rule of law, civil society, 
and governance—through the National Endowment for Democracy, the U.S. Agency for Inter-
national Development, and the U.S. Department of State.”). 
 125. American Bar Association, Central European and Eurasian Law Initiative in Ukraine, 
http://www.abanet.org/ceeli/countries/ukraine/program.html; 
http://www.abanet.org/ceeli/countries/ukraine/ukraine_2004_elections_activities (last visited 
Oct. 31, 2005).  
 126. Tefft, supra note 50 (“[I]f the [Ukrainian] election once again fails to meet democratic 
standards, there will be consequences for [U.S.-Ukrainian] relationship, for Ukraine’s hopes for 
Euro-Atlantic integration, and for individuals responsible for perpetrating fraud.”). 
 127. See Ludwikowski, supra  note 121, at 4 (suggesting that the “drafters in post-socialist 
states looked most often to the liberal traditions of the United States”). 
 128. Rezie, supra note 28, at 170. 
 129. Ludwikowski, supra note 121, at 12 (noting that the Ukrainian Const itution “clearly 
borrowed from the American presidential system” and the U.S. Constitution). 
 130. See Rezie, supra note 28, at 181. 
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powers and provide for the three branches of government with exclu-
sive executive, legislative, and judicial powers.131  Second, the U.S. 
and Ukrainian constitutions list virtually identical fundamental 
rights.132  Finally, both constitutions are considered “the supreme law 
of the land.”133 
First, and perhaps the most significant similarity between the two 
constitutions is Ukraine’s borrowing of the U.S. principle of separa-
tion of powers,134 set forth in Articles V, VI, and VIII of the Ukrain-
ian Constitution.135  Ukraine established this principle on paper and is 
currently moving towards implementing it in practice (albeit not 
without a struggle).136 
As one legal scholar noted, in order to successfully implement a 
separation of powers system, “a constitution must establish branches 
of government that are not only separate but also coordinate and 
equal.”137  Accordingly, the Ukrainian Constitution not only creates 
the three branches of government, but also attributes exclusive pow-
ers to each of these branches.138  The president, although called the 
“Head of State,” performs functions of the Commander-and-Chief, 
similar to the U.S. president.139  The Parliament, similar to the U.S. 
Congress, has legislative power.140  Finally, the judicial branch has the 
sole power to interpret the law.141 
 
 131. Compare KONSTITUTSIYA UKRAINI  arts. 75-112, 121-23 with U.S. CONST. arts. I-III. 
 132. See supra notes 147-54 and accompanying text. 
 133. Compare KONSTITUTSIYA UKRAINI art. 8 with U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.  See also 
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 326-27 (1819) (“The constitution . . . shall be the 
supreme law of the land . . . and it confides to this Court the ultimate power of deciding all que s-
tions arising under the constitution and laws of the United States.”) (emphasis added). 
 134. Compare KONSTITUTSIYA UKRAINI   arts. 75-112, 121-23 with U.S. CONST. arts. I-III. 
 135. See Futey, supra note 28, at 31. 
 136. Communists opposed the separation of powers, arguing that it was “a lofty principle, 
and that even in the USA the unity of the state power took priority over separation.”  See 
WOLCZUK, supra note 14, at 142.  On the other hand, national-democrats “argued that the prin-
ciple of separation of powers would be best adopted to the Ukrainian conditions in a preside n-
tial system, which denoted a div ision of powers between the legislature and a directly elected, 
executive presidency modeled on the American system . . . .”  Id. at 145 (emphasis added). 
 137. Futey, supra note 28, at 31. 
 138. See KONSTITUTSIYA UKRAINI  arts. 75-112, 121-23. 
 139. WOLCZUK, supra note 14, at 240. 
 140. KONSTITUTSIYA UKRAINI  art. 75 (“The sole body of legislative power in Ukraine is 
the Parliament—the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine.”). 
 141. KONSTITUTSIYA UKRAINI   art. 124 (“Justice in Ukraine is administered exclusively by 
the courts.  The delegation of the functions of courts, and also the appropriation of these func-
tions by other bodies or officials, shall not be permitted.”).  
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The Ukrainian Constitution provides for a similar structure of 
courts to that in the United States: there are district courts, appellate 
courts, and the Supreme Court.142  Like the U.S. Supreme Court deci-
sion in Bush v. Gore,143 courts in “Ukraine took a decisive step to-
wards the judicialization of political power, subjecting political dis-
putes to judicial decisions, in order to resolve the power 
conflict . . . .”144  However, unlike in the United States, there is an in-
dependent Constitutional Court in Ukraine, which has the sole power 
to interpret the Constitution and to decide constitutionality of laws.145  
Despite these minor differences, the separation of powers concept is 
live and well in Ukraine, and most of the functions and duties of the 
Executive, Legislative, and Judicial branches are similar to those in 
the United States.146 
The second important similarity between Ukrainian and U.S. 
constitutions is a similar list of fundamental rights and freedoms.  The 
Ukrainian Constitution contains “virtually innumerable” guarantees 
of individual rights, most of which are borrowed from the U.S. Con-
stitution.147  For example, both constitutions have identical guarantees 
of freedom of speech, religion, and movement; protection from dou-
ble jeopardy; and the right to vote.148  Both constitutions are also simi-
lar in that they set forth some limitations on individual rights and 
freedoms.149  The Ukrainian Constitution enumerates those rights 
 
 142. See KONSTITUTSIYA UKRAINI  arts. 124, 125. 
 143. 531 U.S. 98, 111 (2000). 
 144. WOLCZUK, supra note 14, at 240. 
 145. Id. at 240 (“The principle of the separation of powers was vindicated in the provision of 
the Constitutional Court, which has given sole authority to constitutional jurisdiction . . . .”). 
 146. See id. at 247, noting that the Ukrainian Constitution “was far from an ‘innovative 
leap,’ or ‘conceptual revolution’; it predominantly aspired to match and conform to uniform 
standards . . . rather than to invent new ones.” 
 147. Anna M. Kuzmik, Recent Development, Rule of Law and Legal Reform in Ukraine: A 
Review of the New Procuracy Law 34 HARV. INT’L L.J. 611, 621-22 (1993); see also Rezie, supra 
note 28, at 207.  For a list of Ukrainian fundamental rights, see Futey, supra note 28, at 32. 
 148. Compare, e.g., KONSTITUTSIYA UKRAINI   arts. 21-68 with U.S. CONST. amends. I, V, 
XXVI. 
 149. For example, in some circumstances the government may limit individual’s right to free 
speech.  See KONSTITUTSIYA UKRAINI   art. 34 (guaranteeing the right to free speech, thought, 
and expression but providing that legal restrictions may be imposed on the exercise of these 
rights “in the interests of national security, territorial indivisibility or public order, with the pur-
pose of preventing disturbances or crimes, protecting the health of the population, the reputa-
tion or rights of other persons, preventing the publication of information received confide n-
tially, or supporting the authority and impartiality of justice.”); U.S. CONST. amend. I; Ward v. 
Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) (“[G]overnment may impose reasonable restric-
tions on the time, place, or manner of protected speech, provided the restrictions ‘are justified 
without reference to the content of the regulated speech, that they are narrowly tailored to 
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that are merely implied in the U.S. Constitution, for example the right 
to privacy, the right to family, and the right to education.150  Having 
finally become independent, Ukrainians overemphasized the need for 
a guarantee of “liberties that Ukrainian people never possessed.”151  
Hence, numerous Parliamentary debates, amendments, and revisions 
resulted in a very elaborate constitution.152  Enumerated rights in the 
Ukrainian Constitution have become so expansive that one legal 
scholar placed the Ukrainian Constitution among “the nine most 
‘generous’ constitutions which list comprehensive social security, edu-
cation, health care, work protection rights, and other socioeconomic 
rights . . . .”153  Despite a concern that the rights may be too expansive 
to actually implement, the Ukrainian Constitution does make “great 
strides toward a democratic society.”154 
The third important similarity between the two constitutions is 
the supremacy of the Constitution over legislative acts and judicial 
decisions.  Both Article I of the Ukrainian Constitution and Article 
VI of the U.S. Constitution provide that the constitution is the su-
preme law of the land.155  Importantly, neither constitution can be re-
pealed or superseded by any law—it can only be amended.156  Recent 
decisions show that, although the supremacy concept is more estab-
 
serve a significant governmental interest, and that they leave open ample alternative channels 
for communication of the information.’” (quoting Clark v. Cmty. For Creative Non-Violence, 
468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984)).  See Futey, supra note 28, at 30 for a detailed examination of limita-
tions on the rights of Ukrainian citizens. 
 150. KONSTITUTSIYA UKRAINI  arts. 31, 32, 53. 
 151. Futey, supra note 28, at 29.  For example, some of the rights that were denied to Soviet 
citizens were the right to travel, the right to privacy, and the right to free speech.  Id. 
 152. The Ukrainian Constitution was drafted by members of the Ukra inian Parliament, who 
began deliberations and revisions of the constitutional draft immediately after the breakup of 
the Soviet Union.  See WOLCZUK, supra note 14, at 193.  As the Eighth Circuit noted, the 
Ukrainian government “changed fundamentally following the breakup of the Soviet Union.  
The 1996 Ukrainian Constitution and a 1991 Law on Freedom of Conscience and Religion pro-
vide protection for religious freedoms, and current citizenship laws encourage the  existence of a 
multi-ethnic country.”  Fisher v. I.N.S., 291 F.3d 491, 493 (8th Cir. 2002). 
 153. Wojciech Sadurski, Postcommunist Charters of Rights in Europe and the U.S. Bill of 
Rights, 65 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 223, 233 & n. 63 (2002).  Moreover, the Constitution pro-
vides that this list of rights is not exhaustive, and new laws may guarantee additional rights.  
Ludwikowski, supra  note 121, at 24. 
 154. Rezie, supra note 28, at 207. 
 155. Compare KONSTITUTSIYA UKRAINI   art. 8 with U.S. CONST. art. VI cl. 2. 
 156. Compare KONSTITUTSIYA UKRAINI   arts. 154-59 with U.S. CONST. art. V.  In Ukraine, 
amendments must be ratified by two-thirds of parliament.  KONSTITUTSIYA UKRAINI   art. 156.  
The United States Constitution can be amended by ratification from the States.  U.S. CONST. 
art. V. 
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lished in the United States, it is similarly respected by Ukrainian 
courts.157 
The supremacy, separation of powers, and the fundamental 
rights provisions are the three most significant concepts borrowed 
from the U.S. Constitution.  Minor differences in the constitutional 
structure, variety of enumerated rights, and deviations of powers of 
the three branches of government are relatively easy to reconcile.  
While mirroring the structure of the U.S. Constitution, the drafters 
had to expand the Ukrainian Constitution to tailor it to the needs of 
the post-Soviet emerging democratic government.158  Despite this ex-
pansion, the substantial similarities between the Ukrainian and the 
U.S. constitutions vividly portray the extent of the U.S. impact on the 
Ukrainian Constitution.159 
B. U.S. Influence on the Ukrainian Judiciary 
The U.S. Constitution was only one of many ways through which 
the United States influenced the Ukrainian judiciary.  In the years 
since Ukraine’s independence, various U.S. organizations have made 
a significant impact on practices and procedures implemented by 
Ukrainian judges.160  Even at present, many of these organizations 
have offices in Ukraine.161  They conduct various activities, sponsor-
ing seminars and educating Ukrainian judges and law students on 
how to implement the “rule of law.”162  The “rule of law” is the con-
cept enumerated in many European constitutions.  One of its signifi-
cant meanings is that the government can be sued for its acts—a con-
cept previously unknown to the Soviet Ukraine.163 
 
 157. See, e.g., Decision of the Ukrainian Supreme Court of December 3, 2004, supra  note 55. 
 158. See WOLCZUK , supra  note 14, at 193. 
 159. See Rezie, supra note 28, at 181. 
 160. See International Cooperation (1994-2002) http://www.scourt.gov.ua (last visited Oct. 
31, 2005) (follow “Mijnarodni Zvyazki” hyperlink, then follow “Uchast u Navchalnih Pro-
gramah” hyperlink) (discussing the “Rule of Law” program, under which the Ukrainian Su-
preme Court and the U.S. Government “work together to strengthen the capacity of judiciary 
and general courts’ staff”) [Hereinafter “International Cooperation”]; American Bar Associa-
tion, supra note 125; Ukrainian Legal Foundation, Informational Resource Portal, 
http://www.ulf.com.ua/eng/about.asp (last visited Sept. 26, 2005). 
 161. American Bar Association, supra note 125. 
 162. America and the Court: Interview with Justice Sandra Day O’Connor (C-Span televi-
sion broadcast July 24, 2005) (discussing her involvement with CEELI and the successful devel-
opment of the rule of law in Ukraine). 
 163. See Futey, supra note 28, at 30. 
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The American Bar Association is one of the leading organiza-
tions providing legal training and financial assistance for such semi-
nars in Ukraine.164  As a result of these seminars, Ukrainian judges 
are now better equipped to decide cases, interpret the Constitution, 
and even write dissenting and concurring opinions.165  The citizens are 
beginning to trust the judicial system and are increasingly relying on 
courts to decide many disputes for which they previously had no legal 
recourse.166  More and more cases are being filed, and the Supreme 
Court already reports that its docket is full.167  Other courts are 
flooded with lawsuits as well.  For example, in one of the recent cases 
brought before the Ukrainian Constitutional Court, “[i]t took three 
years to finish oral arguments.”168 
The Constitution now plays an important role in many deci-
sions.169  Similar to U.S. judges, Ukrainian judges interpret the Consti-
tution by looking at its plain language and by analyzing the drafters’ 
intent and historical circumstances.170  This decision-making approach 
was first articulated by the U.S. Supreme Court in Martin v. Hunter’s 
Lessee in 1816.171 
The Ukrainian Supreme Court has also been taking significant 
steps towards establishing its authority as the highest court.172  It em-
phasizes in every case that its decision is final and binding.173  The 
Court also went so far as to assume it has jurisdiction over all legal 
matters.174  In the Yuschenko case, the Court declared acts of the Cen-
tral Elections Committee unconstitutional, without referring the 
 
 164. See American Bar Association, supra  note 125. 
 165. See id. 
 166. See Futey, supra note 28, at 29. 
 167. Sudova Statistica [Judicial Statistics for 2004], http://www.scourt.gov.ua (follow “Judi-
cial Practice” hyperlink; then follow “Judicial Statistics” hyperlink; then follow “2004” hype r-
link) (last visited Oct. 31, 2005).  According to judicial statistics, the amount of claims that were 
filed with or appealed to the Ukrainian Supreme Court has increased by forty percent in 2004, 
with the Court having to decide 67,000 cases in 2004.  Id. 
 168. Alexei Trochev, Constitutional Developments, Ukraine: Constitutional Court Invali-
dates Ban on Communist Party, 1 INT. J. CONST. L. 534, 536 (2003). 
 169. Futey, supra note 28, at 29. 
 170. See generally Official Website of Constitutional Court of Ukraine, Akti KSU: Rishe n-
nya KSU [Acts and Decisions of the Constitutional Court], 
http://www.ccu.gov.ua/pls/wccu/P000?lang=0 (last visited Oct. 31, 2005) for a number of deci-
sions interpreting the Ukrainian Constitution. 
 171. 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 326-52 (1816). 
 172. See, e.g., Decision of the Ukrainian Supreme Court of December 3, 2004, supra  note 55. 
 173. See id. 
 174. See id. 
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question to the Constitutional Court.175  This unprecedented move 
suggests that the Court views itself as a binding authority with the 
power to decide all matters, including constitutional questions.176 
On December 3, 2004, the Court had its own Marbury moment177 
when it considered and invalidated acts of the government.178  This 
decision was also an implied declaration that the Court has the power 
to inevitably influence the outcome of the elections, and thus the very 
makeup of the coordinate branches of government.179  While there is 
no direct evidence that Justices relied on Marbury, or on any prece-
dent for that matter, they all attended the CEELI seminars, and they 
are most likely familiar with the U.S. landmark cases.180  Because the 
Court’s legal database is not sufficiently updated, it is unclear 
whether this was the first time that the Court undertook to declare a 
law unconstitutional. 
It is quite possible that Ukraine will create its own system of 
precedents in the future.181  Efforts are now being made to translate 
the decisions of the European Court of Human Rights into 
Ukrainian, which may lead to a system of stare decisis.182  The cost of 
these translations is sponsored in large part by U.S. organizations.183 
Overall, the United States has played a significant role in shaping 
the judiciary in Ukraine.184  Some factors already demonstrate that 
 
 175. See id. 
 176. See id.; an excerpt in English is available at 
http://www2.pravda.com.ua/en/archive/2004/december/3/5.shtml (last visited Oct. 31, 2005) 
(“The above circumstances give reasons to conclude that the violations of the principles of the 
law of elections envisaged in Art. 38, 71, 103 of the Constitution of Ukraine and of the funda-
mentals of the election process envisaged in Art. 11 part 2 of the President Election Act exclude 
any possibility to precisely establish the will of the voters.”). 
 177. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (“It is emphatically the 
province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.  Those who apply the rule to 
particular cases, must of necessity expound and interpret that rule.  If two laws conflict with 
each other, the courts must decide on the operation of each.”). 
 178. See Decision of the Ukrainian Supreme Court of December 3, 2004 , supra note 55. 
 179. See id. 
 180. See America and the Court: Interview with Justice Sa ndra Day O’Conner, supra note 
162 (noting that all Ukrainian Supreme Court Justices attended CEELI seminars). 
 181. See Ukrainian Legal Foundation, supra note 160 (discussing an implementation of the 
system of precedents by Ukrainian courts for human rights cases). 
 182. Id.  (“In 1999, the Ukrainian Legal Foundation launched a project providing for the 
translation of judgments of the European Court of Human Rights into the Ukrainian language 
and their publication . . . .”). 
 183. Id. 
 184. See id.; see also International Cooperation, supra  note 160, (noting the steps taken by 
the United States to educate the Ukrainian judiciary). 
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Ukraine is moving toward a semi-common-law system.185  With the 
proper assistance from the United States, Ukrainian democratic fu-
ture and unbiased judicial opinions are realistic goals. 
C. Role of the United States in the 2004 Ukrainian Election 
The most important evidence of the U.S. impact on Ukraine was 
the U.S. involvement in the 2004 Ukrainian presidential election.  
Both the United States government and U.S. nongovernmental or-
ganizations played an active role in the elections.186  Undoubtedly, 
Ukraine owes its Orange Victory in part to the United States.187 
The United States influenced the Ukrainian elections in four 
very important ways.  First, for a year preceding the elections, the 
American Bar Association sponsored seminars to educate Ukrainian 
judges on the elections process and on the role of the judiciary in po-
litical elections.188  Second, the United States provided 147 independ-
ent observers to monitor the elections.189  Third, the United States of-
fered help to the protestors and thus ensured that they were able to 
continue protesting peacefully.190  Fourth, U.S. ideals and political 
pressure positively encouraged justices of the Ukrainian Supreme 
Court to decide the case fairly.191 
Remarkably, the United States was able to foresee problems 
with the election process in Ukraine long before this controversial 
election took place.192  In 2003, the American Bar Association imple-
mented a “USAID-funded elections project assisting judges, lawyers, 
election officials and the general public in the run-up to Ukrainian 
presidential election.”193  This project was launched through the 
 
 185. For example, it is not uncommon for Ukrainian judges to issue concurring or dissenting 
opinions or to cite other cases or international law in their decisions.  See, e.g., Trochev, supra 
note 168, at 537. 
 186. See Presidential Runoff Election in Ukraine, S. Res. 487, 108th Cong. (2004). 
 187. The term “Orange Revolution” was coined by the media because Yushchenko’s cam-
paign color was orange, and his supporters wore orange scarves and carried orange flags while 
protesting the fraudulent elections. 
 188. American Bar Association, supra note 125. 
 189. CEC, supra note 9, Official Observers. 
 190. See generally Presidential Runoff Election in Ukraine , S. Res. 487, 108th Cong. (2004) 
(for a discussion of the steps the United States government implemented to ensure a peaceful 
resolution of the elections conflict). 
 191. See S. Res. 487; see also Tefft, supra  note 50 (for a discussion of the steps the United 
States undertook to ensure the fair election process in Ukraine). 
 192. See American Bar Association, supra  note 125. 
 193. Id. 
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ABA’s Central European and Eurasian Law Initiative (CEELI).194  
The former United States Supreme Court Justice Sandra Day 
O’Connor was actively involved in this program.195 
In the year preceding the elections, CEELI held a number of 
seminars for Ukrainian judges on the role of the judiciary in the de-
mocratic elections.196  Justice O’Connor, who took part in organizing 
these seminars, noted that the “program was attended by every one of 
the Justices” of the Ukrainian Supreme Court.197 
Only two months before the decisive election, CEELI held “ten 
regional trainings for judges on election legislation and its applica-
tion.”198  The training sessions were a great success, with approxi-
mately seventy judges attending each session.199  When the time came 
to decide the landmark case, the Supreme Court was prepared to 
handle the issue. 
CEELI also took active steps in educating Ukrainian citizens on 
their right to vote,200  including holding classes and issuing public me-
dia announcements in the week before the elections and encouraging 
Ukrainians to vote.201  Furthermore, CEELI registered a hotline 
where citizens could report election irregularities.202  On election day, 
the hotline had registered over seven thousand calls from concerned 
voters.203  According to CEELI, at least ten percent of the Ukrainian 
population was denied the right to vote in the second round of presi-
dential elections.204 
The United States Government did not stand by passively either.  
In light of the election problems and allegations of fraud, the United 
States sent independent observers to Ukraine to monitor the electoral 
process.205  Among the observers was Senator Richard Lugar, desig-
 
 194. Id. 
 195. America and the Court: Interview with Justice Sandra Day O’Conner, supra note 162 
(discussing her involvement in CEELI and her observations of the Ukrainian election). 
 196. American Bar Association, supra  note 125. 
 197. America and the Court: Interview with Justice Sandra Day O’Conner, supra note 162. 
 198. American Bar Association, supra note 125. 
 199. Id. (“Each participating judge received training materials that CEELI had developed.  
These materials were also sent to every court in Ukraine.”). 
 200. Id. 
 201. Id. 
 202. Id. 
 203. Id. 
 204. American Bar Association, supra note 125. 
 205. CEC, supra note 9, Official Observers. 
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nated by President Bush as the official U.S. representative.206  When 
Yushchenko supporters began their peaceful protests on the streets of 
Kiev, the U.S. nongovernmental organizations were among the coun-
tries providing food, blankets, and medical care to protestors.  After 
the second problematic round of elections, several members of Con-
gress made statements concerning the Ukrainian elections. These 
statements were entitled “Election in Ukraine,”207 “Stakes in the 
Ukrainian Election,”208 and “Presidential Runoff Election in 
Ukraine.”209 
On November 24, shortly after the controversial second round, 
Representative Jo Ann Davis noted that, “[r]egrettably, and despite 
every effort we were told would be made by the [Ukrainian] Gov-
ernment for a free and fair election, the rhetoric was not matched by 
the actions.”210  Representative Davis called upon the incumbent 
Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma, the Ukrainian Parliament, and 
the Ukrainian Supreme Court “to conduct a thorough review” of the 
elections, to investigate charges of fraud, and to hold new elections.211  
In the event that the dispute was not resolved, Representative Davis 
urged the Bush administration to “take whatever actions may be nec-
essary to express [the U.S.] displeasure with the actions of the 
Ukraine government.”212  History has illustrated that this statement 
was not disregarded by high Ukrainian officials. 
In his statement, Representative Leach used an even more con-
demning tone, referring to Ukrainian citizens “standing up against 
forces of injustice and oppression.”213  He urged that “free elections 
are not an issue on which the United States should” compromise.214  
The following day, the Senate passed a resolution condemning the 
widespread fraud and expressing support for a “peaceful and legal 
settlement . . . that reflects the will of the people of Ukraine.”215 
 
 206. See Presidential Runoff Election in Ukraine, S. Res. 487, 108th Cong. (2004) (“Whereas 
such reports of fraud were also echoed by Senator Richard Lugar of Indiana  . . . an observer to 
the runoff election designated by President George W. Bush.”) (emphasis added). 
 207. 150 CONG. REC. E2138 (daily ed. Nov. 24, 2004) (statement of Rep. Davis). 
 208. 150 CONG. REC. E2198 (daily ed. Dec. 7, 2004) (statement of Rep. Leach). 
 209. 150 CONG. REC. S12021 (daily ed. Dec. 8, 2004) (statements of Sens. Frist and Reid); S. 
Res. 487, 108th Cong. (2004). 
 210. See id. 
 211. Id. 
 212. Id. 
 213. 150 CONG. REC. E2198 (daily ed. Dec. 7, 2004) (statement of Rep. Leach). 
 214. Id. 
 215. Presidential Runoff Election in Ukraine, S. Res. 487, 108th Cong. (2004). 
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The United States promised to work with the winner of a free 
and fair election.216  Such actions, coupled with U.S. financial support 
and the political pressure that the United States exerted on Ukraine, 
greatly contributed to the fair outcome of the 2004 Presidential elec-
tion.217 
The Ukrainian Supreme Court followed the steps of the U.S. Su-
preme Court in Bush v. Gore by deciding to play an active role in the 
outcome of the presidential election.218  In a unanimous decision, the 
Justices declared that the results of the second round of election were 
fraudulent and ordered a new runoff.219  Like Bush v. Gore, the Yu-
shchenko case was a decision that shook the world and established 
the Court’s power to decide elections controversies.220  Justice 
O’Connor, who closely followed this hearing, commented on the un-
precedented level of transparency during the hearing, noting that, for 
the first time in the history of the Ukrainian Supreme Court the court 
proceeding was televised.221  She also declared that the Ukrainian 
election was a “success in our efforts to promote the rule of law and 
the independent judiciary.”222 
Without the multitude of ways in which the United States pro-
vided continuous support, the 2004 Orange Revolution—and a de-
mocratic Ukraine—would probably not have been possible.  The 
United States prepared Ukraine for cases like Yushchenko by helping 
Ukraine shape its Constitution, by assisting the judges in issuing un-
biased decisions, and by encouraging the Ukrainian Supreme Court 
to assert its Marbury v. Madison power. 
IV.  CONSEQUENCES OF THE YUSHCHENKO DECISION 
The Yushchenko decision resulted in two significant develop-
ments.  First, the Supreme Court’s decision catalyzed Ukraine’s po-
litical relations with the West.  Second, it strengthened the Ukrainian 
Supreme Court’s authority.  Today, the Yushchenko decision is one of 
 
 216. Tefft, supra note 50. 
 217. See id. 
 218. See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 111 (2000). 
 219. See Decision of the Ukrainian Supreme Court of December 3, 2004, supra note 55. 
 220. See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 111 (2000); see also See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 
Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (“It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to 
say what the law is.”). 
 221. See America and the Court: Interview with Justice Sandra Day O’Conner, supra note 
162. 
 222. Id. 
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the most widely read documents on the country’s online legal data-
base.223 
The Supreme Court’s order to hold a new runoff election re-
sulted in a victory for Yushchenko.224  The Court’s ruling was per-
ceived as the first truly democratic event in the post-Soviet Ukraine.  
However, Yushchenko’s victory “has been seen . . . as hostile to Rus-
sia,” which openly supported Yanukovych during the elections.225 As 
Representative Leach aptly explained, “[f]or the KGB alumni who 
dominate the Kremlin, Ukrainian democracy is more than an embar-
rassment.”226 
By demonstrating its political stand as a democratic government, 
Ukraine secured world-wide recognition and enhanced prospects for 
EU membership.  Joining the European Union has been one of Yu-
shchenko’s long-term goals for Ukraine.227  Now, as President, he is 
actively lobbying the European Community to consider Ukraine’s 
candidacy.228  Yushchenko’s efforts yielded some success: recent polls 
demonstrate great popular support among EU citizens for Ukraine 
joining the European Union.229  The European Parliament “has given 
overwhelming support to a resolution that would offer a ‘clear Euro-
pean perspective’ to Ukraine.”230  However, the European Commis-
sion says that Ukraine’s membership is “not on the agenda,”231 and 
Yushchenko announced recently that Ukraine does not plan to apply 
for EU membership until 2007.232 
 
 223. See Zakonodavstvo Ukraini [Ukrainian Legal Database], Populiarni Dokumenti 
[Popular Documents], http://zakon.rada.gov.ua/cgi-bin/laws/main.cgi?user=d (ranking the Yu-
shchenko case among the most popular documents on the database) (last visited Oct. 31, 2005). 
 224. Yushchenko won the court-ordered runoff election by a lead of 2.2 million votes.  
Chivers, supra  note 61, at A3. 
 225. Yushchenko Urges EU to Admit Ukraine (Dec. 11, 2004), 
http://www.razom.org.ua/en/news/4934/; see also 150 CONG. REC. E2198 (daily ed. Dec. 7, 2004) 
(statement of Rep. Leach) (“Differing with Russia may be politically awkward, but once the 
flame of freedom is ignited, the U.S and other western democracies have no ethical choice ex-
cept to stand up in support of the people of Ukraine.”). 
 226. 150 CONG. REC. E2198 (daily ed. Dec. 7, 2004) (statement of Rep. Leach). 
 227. Brief—Yushchenko: Ukraine Aims to Open EU Entry Talks in 2007 (Feb.  24, 2005), 
http://www.euractiv.com/Article?tcmuri=tcm:29-135898-16&type=News.  
 228. Id. 
 229. European Voters: Ukraine Would Be Most Welcome (Mar. 24, 2005), 
http://www.euractiv.com/Article?tcmuri=tcm:29-137241-16&type=News.  
 230. MEPs Raise EU Membership Prospect for Ukraine, Jan. 14, 2005), 
http://www.euractiv.com/Article?tcmuri=tcm:29-134156-16&type=News.  
 231. Id. 
 232. Brief—Yushchenko: Ukraine Aims to Open EU Entry Talks in 2007, supra note 227. 
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Ukraine’s relationship with the United States has also improved 
significantly.  The runoff elections received significant support from 
the U.S. Congress.233  Additionally, during just the first six months of 
his presidency, Yushchenko met several times with President George 
W. Bush, who reaffirmed his support for Ukraine’s democratic 
goals.234 
In addition to world-wide recognition, the Court’s ruling pro-
vided Ukraine with another important benefit.  Similarly to Marbury 
v. Madison, the Yushchenko decision is an implied declaration that 
the Supreme Court can interpret the law.235  By undertaking to inter-
pret the Constitution, the Court finally claimed the power available to 
its counterparts in other democratic countries.236 For a country that 
has been independent for just over a decade, this is a significant step 
indeed. 
The Supreme Court’s decision points towards a gradual estab-
lishment of an informal body of case law.  Although there is no clear 
system of stare decisis, the Ukrainian Supreme Court’s rulings are 
published in a reporter, and the Court often refers to its prior rulings 
and even sometimes considers decisions of other courts and laws of 
other nations.237  With U.S. assistance, the Justices recently launched 
a program educating Ukrainian judiciary on proper interpretation of 
the law and proper observations of judicial proceedings.238  Efforts 
have been made to translate European Court of Human Rights cases 
into Ukrainian, so that Ukrainian judges can have access to a foreign 
body of law.239  Additionally, more and more Ukrainian sources are 
 
 233. See 150 CONG. REC. E2138 (daily ed. Nov. 24, 2004) (statement of Rep. Davis); 150 
CONG. REC. E2198 (daily ed. Dec. 7, 2004) (statement of Rep. Leach) (“The Ukrainian ele c-
tion . . . is one of the seminal events of this new century.  As members of the American people’s 
House, we are obligated to express our support for the aspirations of Ukrainians.”); 150 CONG. 
REC. S12021 (daily ed. Dec. 8, 2004) (statements of Sens. Frist and Reid); Presidential Runoff 
Election in Ukraine , S. Res. 487, 108th Cong. (2004). 
 234. See generally , Official Website of the President of Ukraine, News, 
http://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/scrolls/news_1_1.html (last visited Oct. 31, 2005) (listing  
the President’s scheduled meetings with foreign leaders); see also U.S. Congress Cheers Ukraine 
Leader (Apr. 6, 2005), http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/4417901.stm (last visited Oct. 
31, 2005). 
 235. See supra notes 178–84 and accompanying text. 
 236. Decision of the Ukrainian Supreme Court of December 3, 2004, supra note 55. 
 237. See generally  Verkhovniy Sud Ukraini [Official Website of Ukrainian Supreme Court], 
http://www.scourt.gov.ua (last visited Sept. 26, 2005) (describing cases in Ukrainian discussing 
the Court’s deference to foreign law). 
 238. Ukrainian Legal Foundation, supra note 160; see also International Cooperation, supra 
note 160 (noting the steps taken by the United States to educate the Ukrainian judiciary). 
 239. Id. 
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translated into English.  For example, the Central Elections Commis-
sion has recently launched an English version of its website.240 
Because of these efforts, the Ukrainian people now have more 
confidence in the administration and the judiciary.  One of Yu-
shchenko’s campaign promises was to fight corruption, and he now 
has the Supreme Court to back him up.  More and more cases are be-
ing filed in courts, demonstrating a rising level of confidence in the 
government.241  Overall, the Supreme Court has gained substantial 
power and support as the result of its landmark case. 
CONCLUSION 
The 2004 Ukrainian Presidential election was proclaimed “one of 
the seminal events of this new century” by a member of the United 
States Congress.242  The election controversy that divided the country 
and almost shook its constitutional core was—for the first time in 
Ukraine’s history—resolved by peaceful and democratic means.243 
From the day of Ukraine’s independence in 1991 through elec-
tion day in 2004, the United States played a crucial role in the devel-
opment of Ukraine’s legal system.  The U.S. involvement began at the 
constitution-drafting stage in 1991, resulting in an elaborate Ukrain-
ian Constitution that adopted the U.S. model.  The U.S. government 
also actively contributed to Ukrainian legal education by providing 
Ukrainian law students with an opportunity to study abroad.  The 
U.S. nongovernmental organizations further supported the develop-
ment of the constitutional process by funding Ukraine’s legal librar-
ies, sponsoring translations of foreign case law into Ukrainian, and 
organizing CLE seminars for local judges.  Finally, the U.S. govern-
ment, having sent independent observers to monitor the election, fur-
 
 240. See Official Website of Central Election Commission of Ukraine, 
tp://www.cvk.gov.ua/pls/vp2004/wp0011e (last visited Sept. 26, 2005). 
 241. See Verkhovniy Sud Ukraini [Official Website of Ukrainian Supreme Court], [Judicial 
Statistics], http://www.scourt.gov.ua (follow “Sudova Praktika” hyperlink, then follow “Sudova 
Statistika” hyperlink) (last visited Oct. 31, 2005).  According to judicial statistics, the amount of 
claims that were filed in Ukrainian courts has increased by approximately thirty percent in 2004.  
Id. 
 242. 150 CONG. REC. E2198 (daily ed. Dec. 7, 2004) (statement of Rep. Leach). 
 243. Futey, supra note 28, at 34: 
In reaching a political consensus and adopting a constitution based on broadly democ-
ratic principles, the members of Parliament have taken a step toward securing 
Ukraine’s place among democratic societies.  Above all, as in previous instances, such 
as reaching an accord on the constitutional agreement in 1995, Parliament and the 
president solved their differences in a diplomatic and civilized manner, rather than 
through the use of force.  This is therefore an auspicious beginning. 
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ther exerted political pressure on Ukraine’s administration to assist 
the Supreme Court without undue interference.  President Bush is-
sued several official statements to that effect, and three congressional 
hearings were held discussing elections violations in Ukraine. 
The U.S. efforts resulted in an unprecedented level of transpar-
ency and effectively provided Ukrainians with an opportunity to vote 
in a truly democratic election for the first time.  However, the U.S. 
government contemplated a mutual benefit, as it understood that its 
involvement in the Ukrainian legal sphere would prove highly expe-
dient in the long run.  First, the 2004 election significantly improved 
Ukraine’s chances of joining the European Union and bringing 
Ukraine in line with Western ideology.  Second, the United States has 
firmly secured Ukraine’s support in the international political arena.  
Most importantly, the United States can be certain that Russia may 
no longer rely on Ukraine as its permanent political ally.  Instead, 
Ukraine—incidentally the largest country in Europe—has turned to 
the United States for guidance. 
Needless to say, Ukraine has also benefited endlessly from the 
U.S. involvement.  The Supreme Court has finally established its au-
thority as part of an independent branch of government, as well as the 
highest judicial body in Ukraine.  The Court asserted its power to de-
cide the validity of Ukrainian law in its relation to the Constitution.  
In the future, the Court may further expand its power by adopting 
such useful common-law concepts as the system of precedents and the 
dissenting opinions.  Already, polls indicate a significant boost in 
popular confidence with regard to the Ukrainian judiciary. Overall, 
the Orange Revolution—sponsored in part by the Red, White, and 
Blue Nation—has been a great success for Ukraine and for the rule of 
law. 
